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China’s Foreign Investment and Assistance: Implications for Cambodia’
Development and Democratization
Kheang Un
Abstract
With a strong economy and newly acquired confidence following three decades of rapid
economic expansion, China has pursued an outward looking policy based upon foreign
direct investment, development assistance and trade targeting particularly the developing
world. Such expansion has drawn concerns over its impact on human rights,
democratization and the environment. This paper assesses these concerns by examining
Sino-Cambodia relations over the past sixteen years. It concludes that while trade,
development assistance, and investment have had positive effects on Cambodia’s economic
development, concerns that these engagements have derailed deeper democratization in
Cambodia are not deterministic. Cambodia’s authoritarian trajectory is less a product of
China’s engagement and more of the Cambodian elites’ defiance of Western efforts at
democratic promotion and belief in state developmentalism—economic prosperity with
tight political control.

Introduction
Following three decades of rapid, sustained economic growth, the People’s Republic
of China (hereafter PRC or China) has emerged as a strong economic and political player in
Asia and beyond. With a strong economy and newly acquired confidence, China has
expanded its engagement with multilateral institutions, regional organizations and
developing countries. China’s engagement with developing countries rests on its outward
foreign direct investment, development assistance and trade. Although China’s engagement
in the developing world has contributed to the latter’s economic growth, such engagement
has raised concerns over its negative impact on human rights, democratization, and the
environment. Reactions to such concerns have been reflected in Sino-Cambodian relations
through a complex intertwining in areas of trade, investment, diplomacy, development
assistance, and culture over the past decade. Although it is agreed that China’s close
engagement has contributed to opening up Cambodia to the regional and global economy
and thus economic growth, critics have charged that these developments have not only
moved Cambodia deeper into China’s sphere of influence but also increased the power and
legitimacy of the autocratic regime in Phnom Penh, thereby hindering Western countries’
efforts to promote deeper democratization.
This paper addresses the implications of China’s trade and development assistance
for Cambodia’s economic growth and democratization. It is divided into four sections; the
first traces the historical background of Sino-Cambodian relations, including China’s
support for the murderous Khmer Rouge regime. Second, the paper examines Beijing’s
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strategic deployment of soft power and its application to Cambodia. Third, it analyzes
China’s investment and assistance and its impact on Cambodia’s economic and democratic
development. This paper concludes that while Chinese trade and development assistance
have had positive effects on economic development in Cambodia, its impact on
Cambodia’s democratization is not deterministic. Critics who blame China for derailing
deeper democratization in Cambodia overlook first the nature of Cambodia’s domestic
politics and the appeal of China’s soft power, and as well as the complexity of the relations
between Cambodia and the donor community and the latter’s often fractured efforts to
promote democracy in Cambodia.

Historical Background
Sino-Cambodian post-colonial diplomatic relations began in 1958 as Cambodia
searched for friends who could help it navigate the conflict that would engulf Indochina
over the next two decades. Cambodia’s search coincided with China’s quest for influence in
the Third World. Following a meeting between Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Premier
Zhou Enlai at the 1955 Bandung Conference of the non-aligned movement, the PRC and
Cambodia established formal diplomatic relations in 1958. China soon became one of
Cambodia’s major patrons in the latter’s quest for neutrality (Sihanouk, 1958-1959) until
Prince Sihanouk was disposed by a military coup in 1970.
The PRC, after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, was concerned about Vietnam’s
attempt to cultivate a unified Indochina. This troubled the PRC not because it was
concerned about the Vietnamese threat per se, but because the PRC feared the fall of
Indochina into the hands of a pro-Soviet Vietnam. This would eventually enable the Soviet
Union to encircle China from multiple fronts (Ross, 1988, p. 40). As a consequence, the
PRC offered military assistance, including military advisors, to Democratic Kampuchea
(DK) which ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 before it was toppled by the Vietnamese
army (Kiernan, 1991, pp. 132-33; Short 2006). The DK regime undertook an extremely
radical, utopian revolution copying distorted elements of Moa Zedong’s Great Leap
Forward and Cultural Revolution to construct the Khmer Rouge version of a Super Great
Leap Forward. In the course of the social, cultural, psychological and physical destruction
of Cambodia, the DK caused an estimated 1.7 million deaths from starvation, execution,
and overwork, the highest per capita rate of mass killing in modern world history (see
Chandler, 1991; Kiernan, 1995; Becker, 1998).
As news about the DK’s “killing fields” spread worldwide, the legitimacy of the
DK’s resistance to the Vietnamese backed People’s Republic of Kampchea (PRK) could
not be justified; therefore, a more acceptable anti-Vietnamese/PRK coalition was needed.
China, the United States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—
overlooking the DK’s grave human rights violations—backed the Khmer Rouge and two
other resistance movements against the Vietnamese army and Vietnamese backed
government in Phnom Penh. Within this context, political scientist Muthia Alagappa (1993,
p. 201) argues, the Cambodian conflict emerged as “bilateral (Khmer-Vietnamese) and
domestic (intra-Khmer) became internationalized by the dynamics of deep-seated ThaiPeace and Conflict Studies • Volume 16, Number 2
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Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese antagonisms, and global Sino-Soviet and SovietAmerican rivalries” (see also Chanda, 1989). These rivalries sustained the Cambodian
conflict for over a decade. In 1988, Hun Sen wrote in an essay that “China was the root of
everything that was evil in Cambodia” (Jeldres, 2003).
Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and its satellite states, a
comprehensive agreement to the Cambodian conflict was reached in 1991. The peaceagreement led to the 1993 United Nations sponsored elections in Cambodia which
produced an internationally legitimate government. During the first four years following the
establishment of the Cambodia’s new government, diplomatic relations between the PRC
and Cambodia, which was reestablished in 1993, remained mixed. While maintaining
diplomatic relations with the PRC, the Cambodian government permitted Taiwan to operate
a liaison office in Phnom Penh. Legitimate and illegitimate businesses from Taiwan grew
while those from the PRC were limited. The watershed of reestablishing close Sino-Khmer
relations began in 1997, with Hun Sen’s strategic diplomatic calculation to search for a
powerful international ally when his international legitimacy was in question following his
violent ouster of his democratically elected senior coalition partner, Prince Norodom
Ranariddh. The United Nations Security Council, under pressure from the United States,
voted the Cambodia seat left vacant in 1997 as a punishment for Hun Sen’s violent grab of
power. Cambodia’s donors suspended its financial assistance to Cambodia, cutting its
financial blood supply.
As a move to offset the decline in international diplomatic and financial support for
his government, Hun Sen played the China card by “promptly expelled Taiwan’s unofficial
liaison office from Phnom Penh” (Marks, 2000). This policy pleased the PRC, which in
1998 offered Hun Sen a reciprocal response of US2.8 million dollars in military assistance.
In 1999, the PRC provided an additional US18.3 million dollars in foreign assistance and
US200 million dollars in interest free loans—the largest Chinese assistance to any country
to that date (Marks, 2000). In response to China’s indifference to Hun Sen’s use of violence
to consolidate his power, Hun Sen stated:
Although some international community members have not yet clearly
understood the real situation in Cambodia, a number of friendly countries have
maintained their just and fair stance on the Cambodian issue. Among them, the
PRC, which has firmly adhered to the principle of peaceful coexistence,
continues to respect the Kingdom of Cambodia's independence and sovereignty
and does not poke its nose into Cambodian internal affairs (quoted in Marks,
2000).

PRC’s Soft-Power and Cambodia
China’s foreign policy under Moa Zedong stressed self-reliance and the export of
Maoist revolution abroad, of which Cambodia was an infamous recipient during the second
half of the 1970s (Quinn, 1992). The outcome was disastrous for recipient countries as well
as for China. Instead of bringing about economic growth and national prestige, Maoist
revolution led China to economic disaster and international humiliation and isolation. Since
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the 1980s following reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping, Chinese foreign policy shifted
from an ideological to a “ruthless pragmatic” path. This pragmatism centers on a number of
core principles. First, only “economic prowess”—not ideology or military—can lead China
on the path to greatness. Second, the route to economic growth can be constructed on the
principles of peaceful development or global harmony (Pang, 2007; Cho and Jeong, 2008).
Peaceful development requires the maintenance of good relations with foreign
governments, reassuring the nations in China’s neighborhood and beyond that China’s rise
will not be a threat to world order. To advance its foreign policy objective of peaceful
development, the PRC adopted a new foreign policy tool based on the concept of “soft
power” or a “charm offensive” (Kurlantzick, 2006 a, b and c; Pang, 2007; Nye, 2005).
In contrast to “hard power” which is projected through military force, “soft power,”
according to Joseph Nye, “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others …. [It] is
the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It
arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies” (quoted
in Dambaugh, 2008; see also Nye, 1990). Recently, analysts have discussed other attributes
of the notion of soft power. Soft power entails not only the attractiveness of a country’s use
of ideas, culture, and politics, but it also encompasses diplomacy, foreign aid, trade,
investment, and market access to induce other countries to cooperate with, share or follow
China’s world view and development model (Lum, Morrison and Vaughn, 2008; Pang,
2007; Kurlantzick, 2006 a, b, and c).
To many developing countries, Beijing’s use of soft power has created a new
ideology, the “Beijing consensus,” which does not require neo-liberal policies to achieve
economic development. In other words, “an authoritarian political system can be
maintained while also pursuing high economic growth,” through the adoption of
developmental state strategy (Cho and Jeong, 2008: 463-64). As far as human rights is
concerned, Beijing stresses “red rights” a second generation of human rights which
emphasizes the rights to basic needs such as food, clothing, housing, shelter, and medical
care. Beijing also stresses differences in historical, cultural, and economic developments
among world nations to justify its claim that Western style democracy and human rights are
not suitable for all nations. The Beijing consensus, with its focus on social harmony and
order, serves as a countervailing force to the previously dominant “Washington consensus,”
which stressed a market economy with democratic government (Nye, 2005). The Beijing
consensus is popular with both authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments because in
their views it produces “win-win” outcomes wherein Beijing can help them attain economic
growth without interfering in their domestic political affairs.
The year 2000 was the beginning of the systematic implementation of sophisticated
PRC diplomacy based on “soft power”, directed largely to the developing world
(Dambaugh, 2008). As far as developing countries are concerned, China’s soft power
projected through a “charm offensive” entails “… no interference [meaning] no political
strings attached…” (Pang, 2007; see also Lum, Morrison and Vaughn, 2008). Kerry
Dumbaugh (2008, p. 12) describes “no strings attached” by noting, “Chinese money
generally comes with none of the good governance requirements, human rights conditions,
approved-project restrictions and environmental quality regulations” commonly found
attached to aid and investment from Western countries.
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Since the early 2000s, Cambodia is an illustrative case of the employment of the
PRC’s new diplomatic soft power. First, China has used a “charm offensive” in the form of
senior leadership diplomacy. Since the early 2000s, top Chinese officials, including former
President Jiang Zemin, former Chairman of the National People’s Congress Li Peng,
former Premier Zhu Rongji, and current Premier Wen Jiabao, have all visited Cambodia
(Ministry of International Cooperation and Peace, Kingdom of Cambodia, 2009). Each of
these visits was punctuated with announcements of Chinese economic assistance. For
instance in 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao announced a US600 million dollar aid package. To
further legitimize Sino-Khmer diplomatic ties, both Cambodian, and Chinese leaders
touched the close historical link between revered King Norodom Sihanouk and the PRC’s
founding fathers—Chairman Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping.
Further, China has also promoted cultural connections and strengthened its
relationships with the ethnic Chinese community in Cambodia by providing financial
assistance for construction of Chinese language schools, publication of Chinese language
textbooks, and scholarships for Cambodian students to study in China. The Chinese
government also provided assistance for human resource development by sponsoring
training programs for Cambodian government officials in China (author’s interview with
official at the Ministry of International Cooperation and Peace, August 4, 2009; see also
Kurlantzick, 2006a). Furthermore, China has also funded Cambodia’s prestige construction
projects, such as the Council of Ministers building and a planned botanical garden.
More noticeable is Chinese development assistance to Cambodia which has not only
increased dramatically but also diversified. The increase from 2006 to 2007 was 75%, from
US53.2 million dollars to US92.4 million dollars (The Cambodian Rehabilitation and
Development Board of the Council for Development of Cambodia, 2008, p. 8). As of 2007,
China has extended assistance to Cambodia through internationally coordinated
mechanisms in line with its commitment to engage in world affairs through bilateral as well
as international multilateral institutions. In 2007 as part of its expanding involvement in
multilateral institutions, China offered aid through the Consultative Group—91.5 million
out of the 689 million total multilateral package to Cambodia (Lum, Morrison, and
Vaughn, 2008). It is difficult to track China’s aid to foreign countries because it is neither
“provided in regularized annual allotments” nor publicly revealed for reason of avoiding
domestic public criticism of wasteful spending in light of domestic needs (Dumbaugh,
2008). For 2007-2009, on a bilateral basis, China pledged US236 million dollars compared
to US337 million dollars, and US215 million dollars by Japan and European Union
respectively (see Table 1). Thus far, China has funded relatively fewer development
assistance programs; however, when one counts loans and support for public works,
infrastructure and hydropower projects, China is one of Cambodia’s largest donors.
Table 1: Foreign Aid to Cambodia from key donors
Countries 2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
United
22.1
34.3
40.6
43.3
51
States
United
11.6
15.4
17
20.6
20.7
Kingdom

2007
58.1

2008
54.9

2009
52.7

2010
N/A

23.7

37.8

35.3

35.8
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Korea

22.5

10.3

24.1

14.9

13.3

31.4

12.1

19.6

5.6

Countries
China

2002
5.7

2003
5.6

2004
32.5

2005
46.6

2006
53.2

2007
92.4

2008
127.9

2009
67.1

2010
47.5

Japan

105.6

101.2

101.8

111.7

103.7

122.1

144.6

53

26.3

EU
(including
UK)

108.2

114.7

107.1

130.6

156.1

171.4

201.7

191.5

126.3

UN and
191.4
Multilateral
aid

193.4

164.8

187.5

251.2

191.4

297.4

202.9

138.9

Source: The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008, prepared by the Cambodian
Rehabilitation and Development Board of the Council for the Development of Cambodia
for the Second Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF), November 2008, p. 9.

According to the United States Congressional Research Service, China has become
the “primary economic patron” of Cambodia (Lum, Morrison, and Vaughn, 2008). Its
investments in Cambodia have risen exponentially with over 3,000 companies investing in
natural resources, agriculture, textiles, and tourism. Information on the nature on Chinese
firms operating in Cambodia is scarce. Dr. Kao Kim Houn, Secretary of State, Ministry of
Peace and International Cooperation, indicated in an interview with the author that the
Cambodian government sometimes does not know whether a Chinese firm is a state-owned
or a private entity (Phnom Penh, January 23, 09). However, it should be noted that in
Cambodia Chinese companies that invest in critical natural resources, construction and
hydropower plants are state owned, a pattern that reflect China’s industrial investment in
the developing world and in Africa and Southeast Asia in particular (Wang, 2002). In
Cambodia these key state-owned companies include Sinohydro Corporation, Chian Yunan
Corporation for International Techno-Economic Corporation, China Heavy Machinery
Corp., China Southern Power Grid Company, China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC), Guangdong Chenguan Enterprise Investment Group, and China National
Machinery and Equipment Import & Export Corporation (Middleson, 2008a; Global
Witness, 2009; Middleson, 2008b; Barney, 2005). Anecdotal evidence shows that private
Chinese companies also conducted trade in Cambodia and invested in various sectors of
Cambodian economy such as restaurants, tourism, gambling, and fitness club.
Chinese investment in Cambodia climbed from just 17 million or 1.3 percent of total
domestic and foreign registered capital and fixed assets in 1994 to 688,737,099 million or
43.12 percent of total domestic and foreign registered capital and fixed assets in 2005
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(Hing, 2006: 205-216). Chinese investment continued to soar and reached just slightly
under four billion dollars in 2008. Such dramatic increases make China by far the largest
investor in Cambodia. (See Table 2).

Country
United
States

Table 2: Foreign Investments from Key Countries
1994
1995
1996
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

15,276,8
03
43,467,3
05
N/A

11,686,6
50
17,859,7
01
N/A

3,823,80
0
11,188,8
16
23,216,4
21
29,321,1
81
32,355,0
61
35,241,9
29
8,862,92
5
424,997

78,489,6
14
N/A

Thailand

194,426,48 114,380,500
0
7,142,150 207,596,571

Vietnam

N/A

369,499.2

N/A

N/A

871,030

1,002,540

Malaysia

1,417,000

2762881067.1
5

249,075,42
1

118,708,924.
5

147,301,97
8

30,866,72
0

Singapor
e

94,870,800 145,794,981

64,885,646

27,697,278

33,261,340

3,331,185

United
Kingdom

12,125,000 274051592

442,512,31
6

13,990,907

856,990

3,703,302

Korea

N/A

9,455,100

247,139,194

8,452,328

N/A

China

17,000,000 7,502,387

404,267,93
1

58,019,499

179,553,15
4

82,462,38
4

Taiwan

1,215,000

21,943,300

288,605,35
5

90,720,846

223,202,20
5

84,832,63
1

Hong
Kong

7,306,781.
51
N/A

129,219,992

34,481,855

86,551,155

138,787,63
8

52,249,78
4

1,432,500

14,043,150

609,315

3,371,800

4,593,808

Japan

1,220,130

11,187,260

99,626,186.8

6,861,645

24,051,87
5

533,807,88
9

34,757,898

86,572,266

36,618,92
7

Foreign Investment (continued)
Country
2002
2003
United
N/A
N/A
States
Thailand
Vietnam
Malaysia
Singapor
e
United
Kingdom

2004

2005

2006*

2007*

2008*

4,554,852

6,568,285

66.47

9.39

680.09

121.4
8
185.6
0

94.58

3.65
64.46
7.10

N/A

9,968,512

3,050,000

96,094,039

110.12

24,465,09
5
2,006,660

N/A

N/A

N/A

34.21

8,782,485

29,092,350

36,564,993

30.83

7,005,050

6,719,352

30,721,880

15.31

261.2
0
3.04

1,005,000

3,166,126

7400,000

4.54

27.15

11,000,00
0
1,014,525
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3,533,22
9
4,088,69
0
9,314,74
5
92,632,9
89
1,934,076

N/A

China’s Foreign Investment
Country
Korea
China
Taiwan
Hong
Kong
Japan

2002
86,578,35
0
32,880,13
0
11,795,33
0
8,584,490

2003
3,468,915

2004
8,100,450

2005
71,665,651

48,230,61
8

102,214,16
3

2,340,200

3,390,000

2006*

2007*

2008*

1,014.3
1

170.0
7

1,259.5
8

689,737,09
9

745.40

220.7
6

3,976.0
9

18,287,581

14,543,289

64.09

53.93

24.85

6,450,000

N/A

1,749,972

5.57

26.35

N/A

N/A

2,886,814

N/A

3.10

120.6
2

12.43

Source: *is taken from the Cambodian Investment Board of the Council for the
Development of Cambodia, 2006, 2007, 2008; additional data is from Hing Thoraxy, The
Cambodian Investment Challenges in Global Competitiveness (Phnom Penh: 2006), pp.
205-216.

China waived tariffs for over 400 products from Cambodia, over 90 percent of which
are agricultural goods and raw materials (Heinrich Boll, WWF and IISD, 2008, p. 3).
Bilateral trade between China and Cambodia reached 933 million in 2007, though the
balance of trade heavily favors China. In 2007, China exports to Cambodia amounted to
882 million, while the latter’s export to the former was only 51 million (Xinhua, 2008).
China’s largest investment in Cambodia is in hydropower plants, entailing cumulative
investments of approximately one billion dollars (Fullbrook, 2009). Four hydropower
plants have been constructed or are under construction while 19 other dam projects are
undergoing feasibility studies (Middleton, 2008). China has also invested in the
development of a special economic zone in the port city of Sihanoukville with projected
completion by 2015. This special economic zone, when finished, is expected to house some
300 companies with 80,000 job opportunities and US2 billion dollars in export revenues
projected (ASEANAffairs, 2008). Furthermore, China has also invested in agribusiness—
many of the projects are in joint partnership with Cambodian businesses. Another of
China’s major investments in Cambodia is in the garment sector.

China’s Investment and Assistance
A Win-Win Situation?
Analyses of China’s intentions in Cambodia vary. One theory postulates Cambodia
has been incorporated into China’s grand security strategy in an anticipated multi-polar
world—one which is centered around China (Schmidt, 2006). Cambodia’s seaport of
Sihanoukville can serve as one location in a “string of pearls”, strategic locations from
which to secure vulnerable sea-lanes of communication and protect seaborne energy
supplies. China also plans to use the seaport at Sihanoukville particularly for the delivery
point for oil imports from the Middle East (Story, 2006; Perlez, 2006). Furthermore, in
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conforming to China’s 10th Five Year Plan (beginning in 2001) which considers the
Mekong region as a top priority, China in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank
funded infrastructural development projects such as roads, rails and bridges in the Greater
Sub-Mekong region that link Cambodia and the rest of peninsular Southeast Asia to its
Southwestern land-locked region to mitigate uneven economic growth that has over the past
three decades favored China’s coastal region (Schmidt, 2006, p. 48-49). This infrastructure
has contributed substantially to Cambodia’s economic transformation. It has linked
previously remote Cambodian provinces to not only the country’s economic center but also
the broader Southeast Asian economy and beyond.
Another objective of China’s assistance in Cambodia and in other developing
countries is to proudly promote its culture, language and civilization, projected as culturally
deterministic nationalism (Hua, 2009; Cho and Jeong, 2008). China’s assistance to
Cambodia aims at promoting the study of Chinese culture and language, particularly among
Sino-Khmer. A former Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia, Yan Tingai, once stated:
“popularization of the Chinese language in Cambodia far exceeds that in any other
Southeast Asian country. This feather in the cap of Cambodia’s Chinese has made an
enormous contribution to both glorifying Chinese culture and developing the friendship
between Cambodia and China” (Marks, 2000). China also established a FM radio station
whose broadcast focuses on teaching Mandarin and Chinese history.
Cambodia’s ruling party—the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)—has also gained
substantially from China’s investments and assistance. The CPP has gained legitimacy
through its investment in infrastructure, particularly bridges and roads, with funding from
multilateral institutions and bilateral agencies. Funding from these institutions—even
though crucial—are insufficient to address Cambodia’s infrastructure needs; and the
Cambodian government is often frustrated by the imposed conditions of this aid. China’s
economic assistance not only injects additional needed funding to infrastructure
development, but it is also less troublesome. Middleson (2008b, p. 44) expressed this issue
succinctly:
The reality is that many borrowing governments, including the Cambodian
government, are pleased to accept Chinese support, mainly for the construction of
physical infrastructure that dispenses with burdensome and costly environmental and
social safeguard standards in order to accelerate their economic development. The
Chinese government considers even serious human rights abuses an internal affair. As
such, grants and loans through which the Chinese State Council’s foreign policies are
implemented are not attached to conditionalities on good governance.
As part of the PRC’s “going out strategy,” the Chinese government promotes Chinese
FDI manufacturing in host countries of light industrial goods such as textiles, machinery
and electrical equipment that could process Chinese raw materials (Wong and Chen, 2003).
This pattern is reflected in Chinese companies’ investment in the garment sector, which is
the backbone of Cambodian exports and serves as a primary source of employment. This
sector contributed 80 percent of recorded exports, provided 350,000 jobs, and added 2% to
Cambodia’s GDP since 1995. Furthermore, the garment sector has also generated
thousands of jobs in indirect employment. Remittances sent by garment factory workers
have transformed many rural villages where recipients have been able to invest in
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agricultural production resulting in a higher standard of living. In addition to its
contributions to Cambodia’s overall economic growth, the garment sector also serves as a
model for good labor practices which have won approval from both importing countries
and conscientious consumers in the West (Ear, forthcoming).
Furthermore, China’s investment in hydro-power plants helps the Cambodian
government toward achieving its economic development plan, which includes the provision
of cheap reliable electricity as a major component not only for industrial zones but also for
rural Cambodia. Currently, only 20% of households have access to electricity and the
government plans to increase that number to 70% by 2030 (Middleson, 2008b, pp. 25-26).
Furthermore, on top of other issues such as infrastructure bottlenecks and poor governance,
businesses cite high electricity costs as an obstacle to doing business in Cambodia. At
present, Cambodia buys electricity from Vietnam and Thailand, but it has plans to reverse
these trends following the completion of several major hydropower plants. The demand for
electricity in Thailand will increase by 50% by 2021, while that demand in Vietnam will
quadruple by 2015, surges that will be unmet by domestic supply (Middleton, 2008a).
Therefore, Chinese investment in hydropower plants will reduce the price of electricity and
increase the availability of electricity in rural areas. The increase in electricity supply and
infrastructure improvement will further develop Cambodia’s economy, while strengthening
the CPP’s popularity and legitimacy.

A Negative Effect?
Many critics argue that the Chinese government uses its influence and financial
assistance to promote Chinese companies and Chinese interests (Kurlantzick, 2006a,
2006b, 2006c). There are grounds for suspicion given the nature of Chinese companies’
involvement in Cambodia, the secrecy of the bidding process for contracts for minerals
rights, hydropower plants and economic land concessions. Foreign diplomats believe that
“backroom deals” for Chinese companies do exist (McDermid and Sam, 2006). These
backroom deals tend to exist in strategic sectors such as agro-businesses, minerals and oil
which China considered critical for sustainable economic growth.
The Cambodian government denies this allegation. Dr. Kao Kim Houn, Secretary of
State, Ministry of Peace and International Cooperation, Kingdom of Cambodia, contends
that analysts and the press overreact to China’s involvement in Southeast Asia in general
and in Cambodia in particular (interview with author, Phnom Penh, January 2009). Overall,
the Chinese government fulfills the need of the Cambodian government and given their
shared philosophy on politics and economic development there appears to be little friction
between them. An official of a multilateral institution stated that “China goes to recipient
countries doing what they want. The Cambodian government wants infrastructure, so the
Chinese government builds infrastructure for Cambodia (interview with author, Phnom
Penh, January 2009).
However, it should be noted that China’s assistance and investment in resource rich
areas around the globe serves “to facilitate preferential access to such resources, especially
oil” (Medeiros, 2006). One of the key objectives of outward foreign direct investment
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(OFDI) is to acquire natural resources to meet the ever increasing demand for natural
resources that are not fully met by domestic sources (Cai, 1999). A large proportion of
China’s OFDI, which amounts to US16 billion dollars, was in mining and energy (Henrich
Boll, WWF and IISD, 2008, pp. 1-2).
China’s investment in Cambodia is no exception, the focus is on resource exploration
and extraction. Many of these projects, critics argue, do not take into account the impact on
human rights and the environment. “China’s goal is to extract natural resources to serve its
commercial purposes. Thus, rather than a ‘win-win’ situation,” Sam Rainsy, President of
Cambodia’s main opposition party, said “China’s engagement produces a situation of ‘winwin-lose’ in which corrupt officials win and the unscrupulous investors win, but the
Cambodian people lose” (McDermid and Sam, 2006). One western diplomat concurred,
comparing the Chinese companies to “locust” who “consume natural resources, animals,
minerals” disregarding “environmental protection” (McDermid and Sam, 2006).
The investments in agricultural plantations and hydropower plants is another good
example. A Chinese state owned company, Fuchan, in partnership with Cambodian
Pheapimex, developed an agricultural plantation in the northeastern province of Mondulkiri
covering an area of 300,000 hectares. Another Chinese state-owned company, China
Cooperative State Farm Group, in a joint venture with Pheapimex, developed a vast area in
Kampong Chhnang and Pursat provinces. These companies did not produce an
Environmental Impact Assessment as required by law. The impact of these joint ventures
on local communities is extremely severe, including: population displacement, loss of
access to land and resources, food insecurity and impoverishment (Middleson, 2008 b;
Global Witness, 2007; Barney 2005). Another Chinese state affiliated firm, Wuzhishan LS,
was accused by human rights groups of colluding with Cambodian government officials to
grab land from indigenous peoples (Kurlantzick, 2006a). A Chinese SOE, the Everbright
Group—as documented by the environmental watchdog, Global Witness—violated
Cambodia’s Environmental and Forestry Laws and infringed on local communities’
livelihoods (Global Witness, 2003).
Furthermore, through joint ventures, these Chinese SOEs strengthened the financial
positions of Cambodian business tycoons. These tycoons have formed a symbiotic relation
with the ruling CPP whose electoral success and legitimacy rest on vast networks of mass
based patronage sustained largely by financial contributions from Cambodian business
tycoons (Un 2005; Un and So, forthcoming).
China’s investment in hydropower plants is yet another example, according to
critics, of the country’s disregard for the impact its investments have upon local people and
the environment. The examination of the final decision of the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) to withdraw funding from investment in a hydropower
project—the Kamchay Dam—illuminates the difference between Chinese and western
practices as far as human rights and environment is concerned. In the early 1990s, CIDA
conducted a feasibility study of the Kamchay Dam. Although the agency confirmed the
economic feasibility of the project, it withdrew from the project following pressure from a
coalition of Cambodian and international non-governmental organizations who view the
social and environmental costs of the project far exceeding its benefits (Middleson, 2008b,
p. 59).
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Chinese companies and their funders feel no such pressure. Middleson of the
International Rivers writes that: “In many cases, very little detail is publicly available
regarding the projects [hydropower plants] themselves, the agreement reached between the
Cambodian government and the project developer, and the potential social and
environmental impacts” (Middleson, 2008b, p. 28). A major funder for the hydropower
plant in Cambodia is the China Export-Import Bank. Although the Bank adopted
environmental policies in November 2004 regarding its financing of construction projects,
“[T]here remains, however, little evidence of the guidelines for rigorous implementation on
the ground to date” (Middleson, 2008a; see also Middleson 2008b, p. 46). As a result,
hydropower dams have been constructed in protected national forests potentially flooding
animal sanctuaries and precious tropical ecosystems.
However, it should be noted that the rise of Chinese investment in Cambodia is not
attributed straightforwardly to Chinese pressure as some critics have charged. First,
Chinese companies’ successes in securing investments in Cambodia are partly facilitated by
shared values between Chinese investors and Cambodian business communities dominated
by Sino-Khmers. Fareed Zakaria (2008, p. 103) characterizes this phenomenon: “few
Chinese have really internalized the notion that abstract rules, laws, and contracts are more
important than a situational analysis of a case at hand ….” He further states that “[s]ocial
relations and trust are far more important than paper commitments” (Zakaria, 2008, p. 112).
The lack of transparency, rules and regulations in conducting business in Cambodia have
prevented many Western companies from investing in Cambodia (a Western Business and
legal consultant, interview with author, January 2007; a senior Western diplomat, interview
with author, August 4, 2009). However, such an environment does not deter Chinese
companies whose business collaborations with their Sino-Khmer counterparts are based on
mutual trust and experience in operating in a non-transparent and corrupt environment in
their own country (Johnston, 2005; particularly chapter 7). As elsewhere in Southeast Asia
(see for example Yoshihara, 1988 and Yeung 2000), in the role of ethnic Chinese in
facilitating and collaborating investment is crucial because of their political-economic ties
with the ruling elites who exercise discretion in awarding contracts and granting permits for
businesses.
Emerging markets, such as Cambodia, are often considered risky by Western and
typical shared holder companies whose investments generally focus on short term return of
profit. Many Chinese enterprises operating overseas, including in Cambodia, are either state
owned or affiliated. These companies receive financial backing from state-owned financial
institutions such as the China Export Import Bank and the China Development Bank to
promote Chinese investment in apparently risky markets. These banks “largely implement
the macroeconomic policies and political directions of the Chinese central government”
(Middleson, 2008b, 43). As a result, these enterprises can adopt a longer term risky
business horizon, foregoing short term benefits for long term gains, a practice that private
Western companies are not willing to undertake (Official of a multilateral institution,
interview with author, January 2009).

China’s Assistance and Investment: An Impediment to Democratic Promotion?
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For China, aid is “value neutral.” Such neutrality, according to many critics, can
block efforts for the promotion of democracy, sustainable and inclusive development and
environmental protection. In other words, much of China’s assistance worldwide tends to
perpetuate the status quo of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes (Zakaria, 2008,
pp. 118-119). Referring to China’s involvement in Southeast Asia, Joshua Kurlantzick
argues that soft-power allows China to have growing influence, though with potentially dire
consequences “for a region of nascent democracies and weak civil societies,” undertaking
efforts to develop democracy and establish the rule of law and good governance
(Kurlantzick, 2006c).
In Cambodia, it is argued that Chinese investment and assistance strengthen the
ruling CPP because such investment and assistance offer the Cambodian ruling party a
cushion against pressure from Western donors and international financial institutions which
otherwise would have been able to use the Cambodian government for meaningful political
reform (Sullivan, forthcoming). Since 1993, Western countries have provided billions of
dollars for economic rehabilitation and promotion of good governance. Over a decade later,
the Cambodian government has, as Duncan McCargo (2007) suggests, gotten “away with
authoritarianism.” By examining the Prime Minister Hun Sen’s rhetoric on the neutrality of
China’s aid to Cambodia, it can easily be assumed that China’s influence counters Western
intervention in Cambodia, particularly over the latter’s efforts to promote good
governance—a rubric term for judicial, political and anti-corruption reforms. The argument
is that Western donors’ adoption of a firmer stance on governance issues by threatening to
link aid to reform outcomes “will push Cambodia further into the pockets of its biggest
donor—China” (Global Witness, 2009). Under these circumstances, Western donors have
to soften their stance when dealing with the Cambodian government.
This author’s conversation with officials of multilateral institutions and the
Cambodian government indicated that Western donors in fact have limited influence on the
Cambodian government. China’s assistance to and investment in Cambodia, according to
an influential senior Western diplomat, “is not necessarily an impediment” to the promotion
of democracy and human rights in Cambodia. However, the diplomat added, such aid and
investment does offer the Cambodian government more “confidence” in dealing with
Western donors (interview with the author, Phnom Penh, August 4, 2009). The
fundamental problem is not so much the PRC’s engagement in Cambodia as much as the
donors’ lack a unified, consistent and forceful voice when dealing with the Cambodian
government (Ray, 2007; Dr. Koa, interview with author January 23, 2009). Given the lack
of unity within the donor community and Cambodia’s imbedded neo-patrimonial politics,
the ruling CPP has been able to adopt a selective response toward political reform. They
accommodated donors’ pressure to reform certain sectors—such as social services and
health—which do not threaten their power base and personal economic interests (Hughes
and Un, 2007 and Hughes and Un, forthcoming). At the same time, they resist reforming
areas that potentially undermine their grip on power, such as governance, the judiciary and
anti-corruption laws. Such patterns will likely continue, I would argue, with or without
China’s investment or assistance.
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Conclusion
This article has documented the surge in overseas assistance and inflow of FDI from
China to Cambodia over the past sixteen years. This rise forms part of Beijing’s foreign
policy strategy—increasingly recognized as the “Beijing Consensus”—wherein Beijing
uses its newly acquired economic power (financial assistance, investment and market
access) to gain political support from developing countries and access to their natural
resources. This strategy is based on, according to Beijing, the principle that financial
assistance, investment and market access is value neutral; therefore, they should not be
linked to any conditions, as is often practiced within the framework of the Washington
Consensus.
However, critics charge that the hidden agenda and interests imbedded in Beijing’s
notion of neutrality has negative implications for recipient countries in general and under
this investigation, Cambodia. While China’s investment in resource exploration and
extraction in Cambodia has infringed on the local environment and human rights, its
financial aid and investment have blocked efforts by internal as well as external actors to
promote democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Cambodia.
The truth of the matter is more complex and appears more positive than critics have
charged. China’s investment and assistance have helped transformed Cambodia’ economic
landscape bringing more prosperity—of course unevenly and with a certain degree of
human rights abuses—as they link Cambodia’s peripheral areas to its core and Cambodia as
a whole to regional and global economies. The charge that Cambodia’s authoritarian
trajectory a by product of China’s engagement is only partially accurate. With or without
China’s pressure, the Beijing Consensus is appealing to the Cambodian ruling elite who
share the belief in state developmentalism—economic prosperity with tight political
control. Cambodian elites’ defiance of Western efforts to promote deeper democratization
existed even before the presence of China’s investment and development assistance as
evidenced in the 1997 CPP’s coup against FUNCINPEC, a violent consolidation of power
in the midst of western intervention.
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